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 1 Introduction
Advancements in communication and computer technology allow rms to coordinate
complex production processes within large organizational structures. It is common
in modern manufacturing that a large number of agents contributes to a nal prod-
uct even within rm boundaries. While this development may lead to productivity
gains, the increasing specicity of the tasks often renders intra-rm contracts be-
tween agents dicult to write. This is especially true if the characteristics of the
intermediate inputs are only revealed after they have been produced. If agents can-
not commit not to renegotiate an initial contract, the hold-up problem leads to a
suboptimal outcome where agents may produce too little of the required inputs by
not hiring enough workers or by providing too little eort.
In this paper, I show that incomplete contracts play a crucial role for the mode
of foreign market entry. In a model where rms choose between foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) to serve customers through local sales and exporting, contractual
frictions may encourage or discourage FDI compared to a standard trade model
where complete contracting prevails. It is even possible that the share of horizontal
multinational rms decreases in trade costs. This nding is at odds with the well-
known proximity-concentration trade-o (Markusen, 1984, Brainard, 1997) where
more rms tend to prefer FDI at higher levels of trade barriers to save transport
costs. The model thus suggests a novel mechanism explaining the increasing im-
portance of FDI in times of falling trade barriers (Lommerud, Meland and Srgard,
2003).
The paper builds on the notion that contracts are incomplete even within the
rm. The so-called property-rights approach to the theory of the rm roots in
seminal work by Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986). They argue
that ownership rights aect the bargaining position of agents which may increase
or decrease prots of the integrated company thus determining the boundaries of
the corporation. Antr as (2003) applied this idea to the vertical integration deci-
sion of multinational enterprises (MNE) to explain the pattern of intra-rm trade.
In a similar vein, Antr as and Helpman (2004) derive determinants of global sourc-
1ing decisions in a heterogeneous-rms model where incomplete contracts shape the
organizational structure of multinational enterprises.1 A recent empirical literature
broadly supports the incomplete-contracting mechanism suggested in the theoretical
work.2
This paper has nothing to say about the boundaries of the rm, but rather iden-
ties incomplete contracts as a novel determinant for the mode of foreign market
entry.3 In contrast to the literature discussed above, rm boundaries are exoge-
nous in my model by assuming that intermediate goods are solely fabricated in-
house. Hence, both exporters and MNEs are vertically integrated and multinational
companies would be established purely to serve customers locally instead of taking
advantage of production cost dierences for producing intermediate goods.
Nevertheless, incomplete contracts have implications for the attractiveness of
FDI. Every rm (plant) consists of two units, a management unit and a component
supplier each contributing an intermediate input for nal assembly. The manage-
ment owns the property rights of the component supplier and chooses the mode of
foreign market entry. As no enforceable contract can be written between the two
parties within the rm, each party underinvests according to the respective share
they obtain of the joint surplus in the ex-post bargaining. The key idea is that
the management has a stronger bargaining position in a multinational organization
because it can at least partly service one market through exports from its plant in
the other country in case the negotiations fail. Obviously, this eect becomes more
pronounced at lower trade costs.4
However, a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily increase prots.
If the revenue share of the management becomes larger, the ex-ante investment
1Other examples comprise Antr as (2005) and Carluccio and Fally (2010).
2See Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010), Corcos, Iraq, Mion and Thisse (2009), Defever
and Toubal (2007), Nunn and Treer (2007) and Yeaple (2006).
3See Markusen (2002) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) for a more detailed discussion
of other potential determinants for FDI.
4The idea that globalization strengthens the bargaining position of multinational rms has also
been emphasized in the trade union literature by Eckel and Egger (2009). As the organizational
choice aects the wage level, unionization may work as an independent determinant for FDI.
Lommerud, Meland and Srgard (2003) argue in a dierent framework that trade liberalization
may encourage foreign direct investment as the rm can thereby avoid higher union wages.
2incentives of the component supplier become weaker while the management's un-
derinvestment is attenuated. Technology then tips the scales. If the required share
of management inputs is small, the more severe underinvestment of the component
supplier tends to dominate the higher supply of management inputs resulting in
a lower overall prot level. In that case, incomplete contracts discourage FDI. If
technology requires a large input share from the management unit, however, con-
tractual frictions encourage FDI as the implied stronger bargaining position of the
management leads to higher prots.
As both the proximity-concentration trade-o and incomplete contracts operate
in the model, a reduction in trade costs generally has two eects. (i) From the former
channel, it makes exporting relatively more attractive compared to FDI, and (ii)
incomplete contracts may stimulate either exporting (at low management intensity)
or FDI (at high management intensity). It is thus possible that the second channel
dominates the rst when the management input share is large. This establishes a
novel explanation for why FDI may increase in times of falling trade costs.
The paper is organized as follows. I present the model in Section 2 and study the
role of incomplete contracts for foreign direct investment under trade liberalization
in Section 3. Section 4 oers concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider a world with two identical countries where labor is the only factor of
production. Consumer preferences over a dierentiated good X and a homogeneous





Y ; 0 <  < 1 (1)





1= being a CES-aggregator composed of a mass V of dier-
entiated varieties. The parameter 0 <  < 1 governs the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties given by " = 1=(1   ). Utility maximization delivers









1 " dv represents a consumer price index of the dierentiated
good,  p(v) is the consumer price of variety v and E denotes total income. As
individuals spend constant shares of their income on each good, we get CX = E=P
and CY = (1   )E=PY.
One unit of labor is required to produce one unit of the homogeneous good
being sold in a perfectly competitive market. As I assume zero transport costs for
Y , I normalize its price, PY, to unity and choose it as num eraire. Labor mobility
across sectors then pins down wages in both countries to one. In the X-sector,
rms behave as monopolists facing a constant elasticity of substitution. They have
to invest f units of labor to set up a plant in their domestic market. To serve
customers abroad, rms can choose between exporting (subscript e) and foreign
direct investment (subscript m). While the former implies iceberg transport costs
such that  > 1 units have to be shipped for one unit to arrive at the nal destination
abroad, setting up a foreign aliate requires a xed investment of fm units of labor.
Each company consists of two entities: (i) a management unit H supplying an
intermediate input h and deciding about the organizational structure of the rm;
and (ii) a component production unit Q supplying q. Both inputs are characterized
by the same production technology as the num eraire good with one unit of labor
required for one unit of output. To obtain a variety of the dierentiated good, these










where  determines the relative importance of each input in the nal assembly
and ' denotes a rm-specic productivity level drawn from a commonly-known
distribution function G(').
To found a company, the management has to nd a component supplier to engage
4in a specic relationship. With an innitely elastic supply of Q, the management
oers a contract specifying a fee for the right to exclusively supply a component
for the nal variety.5 Although both entities become part of the same company
and the management owns the property rights of Q, each party decides about the
output levels of h and q in an uncoordinated fashion. This notion is based on the
property-rights approach to the theory of the rm postulating that contracting is
incomplete even within organizational structures. According to seminal papers by
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1999), agents cannot commit not
to renegotiate about joint prots after intermediate outputs have been produced
because the precise characteristics of the two goods are only revealed after the
investment is sunk. As writing a contract specifying which intermediate good has
to be delivered under each state of the world would be too costly, agents bargain ex
post about the joint surplus of the relationship.
This idea has been applied to the internalization decision of multinational rms
choosing between in-house production and outsourcing.6 As the choice of ownership
aects ex-post outside options in the bargaining and thus ex-ante investment incen-
tives of agents, incomplete contracting may give rise to arm's-length transactions
or vertical integration { depending on industry characteristics. I deviate from this
literature as ownership is not a choice variable in this model. Here, the management
owns the component supplier under both exporting and foreign direct investment
so that this channel cannot aect the agents' bargaining position. What does aect
the bargaining power, however, is a combination of the organizational choice and
trade costs. While the bargaining power of both agents within the rm is exogenous
for exporting rms, foreign investment strengthens the position of the management.
This is based on the idea that the management of the multinational rm can satisfy
the demand of local customers to some extent 0 <  < 1 by imports from its foreign
aliate if negotiations fail. This leads to a strictly higher outside option for H
under foreign direct investment than under exporting. For convenience, I normalize
the fall-back option for component suppliers under both organizational forms and
5Note that in contrast to the production decisions, the "partnership contract" is complete.
6See, for example, Antr as (2003, 2005) and Antr as and Helpman (2004).
5the fall-back option for the management under the exporting status to zero. Thus,
parties negotiate about a smaller revenue level in a multinational rm than they
would in the exporting regime.7
Labeling rm revenues by r and accounting for trade costs, the outside option
of the MNE-management is r with 0    1 "  1 denoting a trade freeness
measure. Hence, H receives its outside option plus a fraction  of the quasi-rents,
such that r +  (1   )r, while Q gets (1   )(1   )r. I follow the notion
that a stronger bargaining power translates into a larger revenue share such that I
use both terms to refer to . The management revenue shares for both rm types
can thus be summarized as follows:
m =  + (1   )  e = : (4)
It is evident from (4) that the bargaining weights are only identical for both rm
types if trade costs are prohibitively high, that is  = 0, and that m exceeds e
more at lower levels of trade costs.
The management unit chooses h to maximize lrl  hl for each market while the
component supplier Q maximizes (1   l)rl   ql with respect to q, where l = e;m.
Taking the inverse demand based on (2) to compute revenues and plugging in (3)
allows us to derive the optimal supply levels of hl and ql from the two parties'
perspectives.8 We then obtain prots of exporters and multinational rms as
e (') = (1 + )




m (') = 2
(1   ~ m)p1 "
m
P
E   f   fm; (5)
where ~ l = [l + (1   l)(1   )]. Accounting for the incomplete contracting
7Note that I abstract from the case where H can seize the inputs q and re the manager of
the component supplying unit. This can be motivated by the notion that both parties have to
be active in assembling the nal good due to specic know-how. Beyond this, the assumption is
innocent as the outside options of H would be identically aected under both organizational forms.
8See Appendix A for a derivation.





l (1   l)
1 : (6)
Following Do and Levchenko (2009), a xed mass N of management units can
potentially enter the market. Each management knows the rm-specic productivity
level ' and selects the organizational structure that ensures maximum prots. With
an innitely elastic supply of component producers and a zero outside option of this
agent, the fee that Q has to pay upfront to engage in the specic relationship with H
equals the prot accruing to this agent. Hence, all prots fall onto the management
unit in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.9
To see the impact of incomplete contracts on the organizational choice, it is
useful to dene  (')  m (')   e ('). This yields
 (') = [2
   (1 + )]
(1   ~ e)p1 "
e
P




1   ~ m
1   ~ e
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m (1   
m)
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We observe from (7) that incomplete contracts give rise to an additional channel
beyond the proximity-concentration trade-o inuencing the foreign market entry
mode decision. In the case of perfect contracts, 
 = 1 and we obtain the standard
result that more productive rms select foreign direct investment while those rms
with a lower productivity level serve foreign customers through exports. The intu-
ition for this outcome relates to the insight that high-productivity rms sell more
and earn higher prots rendering the coverage of additional xed costs for setting
up a foreign aliate relatively easier (see Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). How-
ever, when contracts cannot be written between agents within the rm at reasonable
costs, 
 deviates from unity. The direction of change can be both positive or neg-
9See Antr as and Helpman (2004) for a more detailed discussion of subgame perfectness in the
Nash bargaining.











ative so that contractual frictions may encourage or discourage FDI. The value of

 crucially depends on the interplay between the bargaining weights l and the
technology parameter .
If the management was able to choose the bargaining power (revenue share)
that maximizes prots, referred to as , it would select a higher  the higher its
input contribution as measured by . As illustrated in Figure 1,  () is mono-
tonically increasing in  with  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1.10 The positive slope of
this function becomes intuitively clear if one focuses on the impact of an increase
in the management's bargaining weight on the investment incentives for each party.
Both agents produce ineciently low levels of their intermediate goods as they only
receive a fraction of the marginal returns to their investments. A higher  fosters
the component supplier's underinvestment in q exerting a negative impact on joint
output according to (3) while the incentives for the management work in the op-
posite direction. If the contribution of the component supplier is low ( is high),
the management prefers a higher bargaining power to extract a higher share of joint
10This gure is borrowed from Antr as and Helpman (2004).
8revenues because the more severe underinvestment in components weighs relatively
little. On the contrary, if  is low and components make up for a large fraction
of inputs in production, the management prefers a lower revenue share in the bar-
gaining to avoid a severe underinvestment in components. I follow the literature in
assuming that the management cannot choose the optimal level of , but only has
the choice between two bargaining positions by choosing the organizational struc-
ture of the rm. This can be rationalized by arguing that the management cannot
commit not to take advantage of the outside option under foreign direct investment
and the component supplier takes this behavior into account.
As interior solutions allowing for co-existence of both exporters and multinational
rms are most interesting, I assume that the xed cost of setting up a foreign aliate
is suciently high such that the least productive rm in the market earns strictly
higher prots from exporting than foreign direct investment. Denoting by '
e the
productivity level associated with zero prots of the least productive rm, I use
 ('









which is assumed to hold throughout the analysis.
3 Trade liberalization and FDI
To obtain closed-form solutions, I take advantage of Pareto-distributed productivity
levels according to G(') = 1   ' k. Without loss of generality, I have normalized
the scale parameter (pinning down the lowest possible productivity level a rm can
draw) to unity. Higher values of the shape parameter k indicate a higher probability
of drawing a low '. Obtaining the cuto productivity of multinational rms from
 ('





















 can generally be smaller or larger than unity, incomplete contracts have an
ambiguous eect on . Recall that rm prots increase in  whenever  <  and
vice versa. For illustrative reasons, I thus depict two distinct cases: (i) one where
 <  and (ii) another where  >  as shown in Figure 1. The arrows in the
gure indicate the direction of changes in  that are associated with increases in
rm prots.
In component-intensive industries, the management would prefer a rather low
bargaining power in order to avoid a severe underinvestment of the component sup-
plying unit. However, choosing a multinational organizational structure moves the
bargaining weight up compared to an exporter rendering prots under foreign di-
rect investment lower for a larger number of rms. If  falls short of the prot-
maximizing level, however, incomplete contracts provide a novel mechanism to in-
crease rm prots: through a stronger bargaining position of the management vis-
 a-vis the component supplier. As a consequence, a higher number of rms prefers
foreign direct investment to exporting. These two distinct cases are contrasted in
Figure 2 with the benchmark case of no contractual frictions (dashed line) for the
range from prohibitively high trade costs ( = 0) to free trade ( = 1).11
Note that the share of multinational rms is aected by two mechanisms in
this framework: (i) the proximity-concentration trade-o, and (ii) incomplete con-
tracts. The former channel in isolation causes  to decline in  because exporting
becomes relatively more attractive at lower levels of trade costs. Obviously, horizon-
tal multinational activity ceases when trade is free. When contracts are incomplete,
multinational activity may be higher or lower compared to complete contracting, but
coincides when trade costs are prohibitively high. The latter must be true because
the outside option of the management is also zero under FDI as the management
does not have the opportunity to serve one market from sales of its foreign plant
such that e = m. Hence, becoming a multinational rm does not imply any addi-
tional advantage. Denoting by ^  the share of multinational rms under incomplete
contracts and by  the benchmark case, we can conclude that ^  <  whenever
11The parameters underlying Figure 2 are as follows:  = 0:8,  = 0:1, f = 1, fm = 2, and
k = 5.
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

 > . Choosing  such that m   for all , we can further conclude that ^  > 
whenever  < . In that case, there is an incentive to engage in foreign direct
investment even when trade is entirely free because the increase in operating prots
due to a higher bargaining weight compensates for the additional xed costs fm.12
The model also allows for the case where the share of multinational rms in-
creases when trade barriers fall. Starting from a scenario where  < , a reduction
in trade costs generally has two eects. First, prots of exporters strictly rise relative
to those of multinational rms due to the proximity-concentration trade-o. While
trade costs fall, the xed costs of setting up a foreign aliate remain unaected.
Second, as prots increase in the bargaining weight in this case, trade liberalization
raises prots of multinationals relative to those of exporters since m monotonically
grows in . Starting from a low level of , a reduction in trade costs may raise the
management's bargaining power suciently much such that the implied increase
in prots from choosing FDI due to the bargaining channel dominates the relative
increase in prots of exporting rms due to the proximity-concentration trade-o.
12Generally, when  is suciently high such that an increase in  boosts m beyond the prot-
maximizing level , the share of multinational rms may drop below the benchmark level under
complete contracts for lower levels of trade costs.
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What implications do incomplete contracts have for the share of aliate sales
in overall sales of foreign-owned rms in a given market? To shed light on this
question, it is useful to calculate the ratio of export revenues relative to revenues of
aliated plants. Denoting this measure by ~ , we get
~  = 
"




















It is then straightforward to calculate the value of aliate sales relative to the sum
of export and aliate sales revenues as  = 1=(1 + ~ ). Figure 3 plots this ratio as
a function of trade freeness for the same scenarios as in Figure 2. Obviously, the
value of exports is zero at prohibitively high trade costs ( = 0), so  = 1. When
contracts are complete,  is decreasing in  with frictionless trade implying zero
aliate sales. This benchmark is represented by the dashed line in the gure. Note
that two eects are responsible for this relationship: (i) a price-demand eect as
a reduction in trade costs increases the value of exports; and (ii) a selection eect
as exporting becomes the preferred mode of foreign market entry at lower levels of
trade barriers. In the benchmark, both channels work in the same direction causing
12a negative link between the share of aliate sales and trade freeness.
How do incomplete contracts modify this relationship? If the revenue share of
the management is above the prot-maximizing level  ( = 0:3; = 0:5), an
increase in  implies a lower share of aliate sales compared to the benchmark.
First, trade liberalization aects the producer price of multinational rms under
incomplete contracts according to (6). With  < , an increase in  increases the
producer price of MNEs leading to both lower demand and prots. This in turn
stimulates more rms to choose exporting as compared to foreign direct investment
magnifying the selection eect of the proximity-concentration trade-o when trade
costs decline. Recall that the share of multinational rms in the total number of
operating rms falls short of the one under the benchmark scenario.
If the management's revenue share is smaller than the prot-maximizing level
 ( = 0:7; = 0:5), we observe a higher level of . Trade liberalization would
lead to a reduction in producer prices of multinational rms and higher prots.
This creates incentives for more rms to organize as MNEs. Finally, if the share
of multinational rms increases when trade costs decline, it is even possible that
 remains constant or slightly increases for a certain range of trade costs (dotted
line). Here, the countervailing eect of an increasing share of multinational rms at
higher trade freeness is strong enough to prevent a decline in .
Taking a look at stylized facts, we observe from Table 1 that the share of local
sales by US aliates relative to total US sales in the respective country or region
Table 1: Share of local sales of US aliates
1997 2002 2008
All countries 60.2 63.5 64.6
Canada 48.3 53.5 58.1
Europe 76.9 78.1 76.9
Notes: This table reports the share of local sales of US
aliates relative to the sum of US exports to that country
and local sales of US aliated plants. The ratios are
computed from US Census data.
13stayed constant (for Europe) or slightly increased (for All countries and Canada)
over the time period 1997-2008. There are certainly a number of potential expla-
nations for this trend. But assuming that trade costs declined over those twelve
years, the incomplete-contracting mechanism suggested in this paper is in line with
these stylized facts and might have contributed to the overall development. It re-
mains an empirical question to evaluate the role of incomplete contracts as a causal
determinant for the share of aliate sales.
One alternative explanation for this trend has recently been highlighted in the
trade union literature. Lommerud, Meland and Srgard (2003) argue that foreign
direct investment helps avoiding higher union wages giving rise to a novel determi-
nant for serving the foreign market locally. While this insight is derived in a model
where one monopolist operates in each country, Eckel and Egger (2009) stress the
role of union wage bargaining in a heterogeneous-rms model with co-existence of
exporters and MNEs. In their analysis, the fall-back prots increase through foreign
direct investment causing lower negotiated wages for multinational rms compared
to exporters. This cost-saving eect provides an additional incentive for setting up a
foreign aliate and can dominate the trade-cost-saving eect of choosing exporting.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have highlighted the role of incomplete contracts for the mode of
foreign market enty. Beyond the well-understood proximity-concentration trade-o,
hold-up problems may encourage or discourage foreign direct investment compared
to a complete contracting environment. This depends on the interplay between
the technologically required contribution of each agent in the production process
and the respective bargaining weights of the negotiating parties. By choosing the
organizational form, the management can inuence its bargaining power vis- a-vis
the in-house component supplier. Under foreign direct investment, the management
obtains a higher outside option than under exporting as it can threat the component
supplier to satisfy demand on one market through supplies from its aliate in the
other country if negotiations fail. Provided the management-related input share is
14high, a higher bargaining power increases overall prots. This gives rise to a novel
determinant for foreign direct investment. On the contrary, if the management-
related input share is low, the management rather prefers exporting to foreign direct
investment to keep the ex-ante underinvestment of the component supplier at a
minimum.
Incomplete contracts also provide a novel explanation for why foreign direct
investment may increase when trade costs fall. This outcome occurs whenever the
prot gain due to a higher bargaining power of the management unit outweighs the
prot loss of multinational rms relative to exporters when trade costs fall. This
result is at odds with the implications of a model purely based on the proximity-
concentration trade-o and in line with stylized facts on the share of local sales by
US aliated companies. It remains an open issue for future empirical research to
evaluate the incomplete-contracting mechanism as a determinant for the mode of
foreign market entry.
Appendix
A Derivation of optimal supply levels h and q
Combining the inverse demand function with the production function (3), we get
revenues







































15Using these insights, we can compute operating prots rl   hl   ql and nally
obtain the prot functions as given in (5).
B Cuto productivities and the number of rms
In this Appendix, I close the model and derive the productivity cutos of exporters
and multinational rms as well as the equilibrium number of operating rms in
sector X. For this, it is useful to derive the productivity level of the average rm in
the market. Average productivity is derived to meet P = 2Mpe (~ ')
1 ". The price
index is given by
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to meet the initial denition of the price index. In a nal step, we make use of the
cuto productivities '
e and '
m obtained from solving  ('
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:
16Using re (~ ') = (~ '='
e)
" 1 re ('
e) together with the zero prot condition of the
marginal exporting rm yields revenues of the average rm as
re (~ ') =
(1 + )k
2(k   " + 1)
f + fm
1   ~ e
:
Aggregate expenditures consist of labor income L and aggregate prots
 =M [(1   ~ e)re (~ ')   (f + fm)]
=M

k (1 + )(f + fm)
2(k   " + 1)
  (f + fm)

:
Noting that E =  ( + L) = 2Mre (~ '), the number of rms obtains as
M =








(f + fm) + (k   " + 1) (f + fm)
:
Plugging M into '
e = (M=N)
 1=k delivers the productivity cuto for exporting
rms which in turn can be used in (B.1) to obtain the productivity of the average
rm.
Finally, indirect utility can be expressed as
V = 






It turns out that welfare is strictly increasing in the trade freeness measure , but on
a lower level if contracts are incomplete compared to a frictionless world. Further-
more, the welfare level decreases the further  deviates from the prot-maximizing
bargaining weight .
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